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Abstract
Cybersecurity is increasingly threatened by advanced and
persistent attacks. As these attacks are often designed to dis-
able a system (or a critical resource, e.g., a user account) re-
peatedly, it is crucial for the defender to keep updating its
security measures to strike a balance between the risk of be-
ing compromised and the cost of security updates. Moreover,
these decisions often need to be made with limited and de-
layed feedback due to the stealthy nature of advanced attacks.
In addition to targeted attacks, such an optimal timing policy
under incomplete information has broad applications in cy-
bersecurity. Examples include key rotation, password change,
application of patches, and virtual machine refreshing. How-
ever, rigorous studies of optimal timing are rare. Further, ex-
isting solutions typically rely on a pre-defined attack model
that is known to the defender, which is often not the case
in practice. In this work, we make an initial effort towards
achieving optimal timing of security updates in the face of
unknown stealthy attacks. We consider a variant of the in-
fluential FlipIt game model with asymmetric feedback and
unknown attack time distribution, which provides a general
model to consecutive security updates. The defender’s prob-
lem is then modeled as a time associative bandit problem with
dependent arms. We derive upper confidence bound based
learning policies that achieve low regret compared with opti-
mal periodic defense strategies that can only be derived when
attack time distributions are known.
Introduction
Malicious attacks are constantly evolving to inflict increas-
ing levels of damage on the nation’s infrastructure sys-
tems, cooperate IT systems, and our digital lives. For
example, the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) has be-
come a major concern to cybersecurity in the past few
years. APT attacks exhibit two distinguishing behavior pat-
terns (van Dijk et al. 2013) that make them extremely diffi-
cult to defend using traditional techniques. First, these at-
tacks are often funded well and persistent. They attack a
target system (or a critical resource) periodically with the
goal to compromise it completely e.g., by stealing full cryp-
tography keys. Second, the attacks can be highly adaptive.
In particular, they often act covertly, e.g., by operating in
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a “low-and-slow” fashion (Bowers et al. 2014), to avoid im-
mediate detection and obtain long-term advantages.
From the defender’s perspective, an effective way to
thwart continuous and stealthy attacks is to update its
security measures periodically to strike a balance between
the risk of being compromised and the cost of updates.
The primary challenge, however, is that such decisions
must often be made with limited and delayed feedback
because of the covert nature of the attacker. In addition to
thwarting targeted attacks, such an optimal timing problem
with incomplete information is crucial in various cyberse-
curity scenarios, e.g., key rotation (van Dijk et al. 2013),
password changes (Tan and Xia 2016), application of
patches (Beattie et al. 2002), and virtual machine refresh-
ing (Juels et al. 2016). For example, Facebook receives
approximately 600,000 “compromised logins” from impos-
tors every day (Barnett 2011). An efficient approach to stop
these attacks is to ask users to update their passwords when
the risk of attack is high.
Although time-related tactical security choices have been
studied since the cold war era (Blackwell 1949), rigorous
study of timing decisions in the face of continuous and
stealthy attacks is relatively new. In 2012, in response to
an APT attack on it, the RSA lab proposed the FlitIt game,
which was one of the first models to study timing decisions
under stealthy takeovers. The FlipIt game model abstracts
out details about concrete attack and defense operations by
focusing on the stealthy and persistent nature of players. The
basic model considers two players, each of whom can “flip”
the state of a system periodically at any time with a cost. A
player only learns the system state when she moves herself.
The payoff of a player is defined as the fraction of time when
the resource is under its control less the total cost incurred.
The FlipIt game captures the stealthy behavior of play-
ers in an elegant way by allowing various types of feed-
back structures. In the basic model where neither player
gets any feedback during the game and each move flips the
state of the resource instantaneously, it is known that pe-
riodic strategies with random starting phases form a pair
of best response strategies (van Dijk et al. 2013). As a vari-
ant of the basic model, an asymmetric setting is studied
in (Laszka, Johnson, and Grossklags 2013) where the de-
fender gets no feedback during the game while the attacker
obtains immediate feedback after each defense but incurs a
random attack time to take over the resource. In this setting,
it is shown in (Laszka, Johnson, and Grossklags 2013) that
periodic defense and immediate attack (or no attack) form
a pair of best response strategies. However, little is known
beyond these two cases. In particular, designing adaptive de-
fense strategies with partial feedback remains an open prob-
lem.
Although the FlipIt game provides a proper framework
to understand the strategic behavior of stealthy takeover, it
relies on detailed prior knowledge about the attacker. In par-
ticular, it requires parameters such as the amount of time
needed to compromise a resource and the unit cost of each
attack (or their distributions) to be fixed and known to the de-
fender so that the equilibrium solution can be derived. These
parameters limit the scope of the attack model, which, how-
ever, can be hard to verify before the game starts. To ad-
dress this fundamental limitation, we propose to study on-
line learning algorithms that make minimum assumptions
about the attacker and learn an optimal defense strategy from
the limited feedback obtained during the game. Given the
advances in big data analytics and their applications in cy-
bersecurity, it is feasible for the defender to obtain partial
feedback even under stealthy attacks. Such a learning ap-
proach makes it possible to derive adaptive and robust de-
fense strategies against unknown attacks where the type of
the attacker is derived from a fixed but unknown distribu-
tion, as well as the more challenging dynamic attacks where
the type of the attacker can arbitrarily vary over time.
In this work, we make a first effort towards achiev-
ing optimal timing of security updates in the face
of unknown stealthy attacks. We consider a vari-
ant of FlipIt game with asymmetric feedback similar
to (Laszka, Johnson, and Grossklags 2013), but with two
key differences. First, we consider repeated unknown at-
tacks with attacker’s type sampled from an unknown distri-
bution. Second, we assume that the defender obtains limited
feedback about potential attacks at the end of each period.
The defender’s goal is to minimize the long-term cumula-
tive loss. Our objective is to derive an adaptive defense pol-
icy that has a low regret compared with the optimal periodic
defense policy when the attack time distribution is known. A
key observation is that the set of defense periods that the de-
fender can choose from are dependent in the sense that the
loss from one defense period may reveal the potential loss
from other periods, especially shorter ones. Moreover, two
defense policies played for the same number of rounds may
span different lengths of time, which has to be taken into ac-
count when comparing the policies. In this paper, we model
the defender’s problem as a time associate stochastic bandit
problem with dependent arms, where each arm corresponds
to one possible defense period. We derive optimal defense
strategies for both the finite-armed bandit setting where the
defense periods can only take a finite set of values, and the
continuum-armed bandit setting where the defense periods
can take any values from a non-empty interval.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a stochastic time associative bandit model
for optimal timing of security updates in the face of un-
known attacks. Our model captures both the limited feed-
back about stealthy attacks and the dependence between
different defense options.
• We derive upper confidence bound (UCB) based policies
for time associative bandits with dependent arms. Our
policies achieve a regret of O (log(T (K + 1)) +K) for
the finite arm case, where T is the number of rounds
played and K is the number of arms, and a regret of
O(T 2/3) for the continuous arm setting.
Our learning model and algorithms are built upon the as-
sumption that the defender can learn from frequent system
compromises. This is reasonable for many online systems
such as large online social networks and content providers
and large public clouds, in which many customers are sub-
ject to similar attacks. In this setting, even if a single user
is compromised occasionally, the system administrator can
pool data collected from multiple users to obtain a reliable
estimate quickly. For example, given the large number of at-
tacks towards its users, Facebook can collect data from thou-
sands of incidents of similar compromises in a short time.
Our online learning algorithms can be used by Facebook to
alert users to update their passwords when necessary.
Related Work
Time-related tactical security choices have been stud-
ied since the cold war era (Blackwell 1949). How-
ever, the study of timing decisions in the face of
continuous and stealthy attacks is relatively new. In
particular, the FlipIt game (van Dijk et al. 2013) and
its variants (Laszka, Johnson, and Grossklags 2013;
Laszka et al. 2014) are among the few models that study
this problem in a rigorous way. However, all of these
models assume that the parameters about the attacker are
known to the defender at the beginning of the game. A
gradient-based Bayesian learning algorithm was recently
proposed in (Tan and Xia 2016) for a setting similar to ours,
where the failure time was assumed to follow a Weibull
distribution with one unknown parameter. In contrast, we
consider a general attack time distribution.
Multi-armed bandit problems have been extensively
studied for both the stochastic setting and the adver-
sarial setting (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi 2012). Many vari-
ants of bandit models have been considered includ-
ing bandits with side observations (Caron et al. 2012;
Buccapatnam, Eryilmaz, and Shroff 2014). In the context of
cybersecurity, bandit models have been applied to anomaly
detection (Liu, Zhao, and Swami 2013) and stackelberg se-
curity games (Balcan et al. 2015). However, the only previ-
ous work that studies the time associative bandit model is
(Gyo¨rgy et al. 2007), where the arms are assumed to be mu-
tually independent. In contrast, we propose to model the op-
timal timing problem in cybersecurity as a time associative
bandit problem with dependent arms and study algorithms
that can exploit side-observations to improve performance.
Model
We consider the following variant of the FlipIt
game (van Dijk et al. 2013) with two players, a de-
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Figure 1: An example of the proposed game model. Blue circles
and red circles represent the defender’s and the attacker’s actions,
respectively. A blue segment denotes an interval where the resource
is under protection, and a red segment denotes an interval where the
resource is compromised.
fender and an attacker, and a security sensitive resource
to protect. The attacker is persistent in compromising the
resource. In response, the defender updates its security
measures, e.g., keys, passwords, etc., from time to time to
thwart the attacker. Assume a continuous time horizon. At
any time instance, either the defender or the attacker can
make a move to take over the resource at some cost. At
time τ , the resource is under the control of the player that
makes the last move before τ . Let τt, t = 1, 2, ... denote the
time instance of the t-th defense action, and xt = τt+1 − τt
the t-th defense period. We assume τ1 = 0 without loss
of generality. Each defense action (move) incurs a fixed
cost CD, which is known to the defender. Let X denote
the set of all possible defense periods. We assume that
X ⊆ [xmin, xmax] with xmin > 0. See Figure 1 for an
example.
We further make the following assumptions about the
game: (1) The attack in round t takes a random time at to
succeed, which is i.i.d. sampled from a distribution Fa that
is initially unknown to the defender. In contrast, the defender
recaptures the resource immediately once it makes a move,
which is a reasonable assumption as it is usually much more
time consuming to compromise a resource than updating its
security measures. We may also interpret at as the awareness
time that the attacker takes to discover a new vulnerability
in the system. We assume that at is out of the control of
the attacker but its distribution is known to the attacker. The
attacker does not know the value of at until it successfully
compromises the system in round t. (2) Whenever the de-
fender makes a move, this fact is learned by the attacker im-
mediately. On the other hand, the defender has delayed and
incomplete feedback in the following sense. First, the de-
fender only gets feedback at the end of each round. Second,
at time τt+1, the defender learns the value of at if at < xt,
that is only when an attack is observed. Thus, the game has
asymmetric feedback, a common scenario in cybersecurity.
(3) The attacker is myopic and does not have a move cost.
Therefore, it always attacks immediately right after a secu-
rity update. Our model and solutions can be extended to the
case when the attacker is myopic but with a hidden move
cost (see the Appendix).
Under the above assumptions, in each round t, the re-
source is fully protected if at ≥ xt and is compromised for
a duration of xt − at otherwise. The loss to the defender in
round t is then defined as:
l(xt, at) = f [(xt − at)
+] + cd (1)
where f(·) models the loss from attack and cd models the
cost of each defense action. We assume that f(·) ∈ [0, 1],
f(0) = 0, and f(·) is increasing. For instance, we can con-
sider (1) a binary loss function where l(xt, at) = 1 + cd if
xt > at and l(xt, at) = cd otherwise; or (2) a linear loss
function l(xt, at) = (xt−at)
+
xmax
+ cd (where the xmax factor
is introduced to normalize the loss value).
The defender’s objective is to minimize the long-term av-
erage loss defined as follows:
λu = lim sup
T→∞
E(
∑T
t=1 l(x
u
t , at))∑T
t=1 x
u
t
(2)
where u denotes any defense policy and xut is the t-th de-
fense period chosen by policy u. Let l(x) = Ea1(l(x, a1))
denote the expected loss of defense period x, and let λ(x) =
l(x)
x denote the time average loss of a periodic policy with
period x. We make two observations: (1) defending all the
time is not necessarily a good option as it may incur a
very high defense cost; (2) it can be shown that the peri-
odic defense policy with period x∗ = minx∈X λ(x) min-
imizes the long-term time average loss (Puterman 1994;
Gyo¨rgy et al. 2007). However, this optimal policy cannot be
found when the distribution of at is unknown. Let λ∗ =
λ(x∗) denote the optimal loss. To find an optimal defense
policy when the distribution of at is unknown, we adopt the
time associative bandit model (Gyo¨rgy et al. 2007) by con-
sidering each defense period as an arm. For a defense policy
{xt}, the (pseudo) regret for the first T rounds with respect
to the optimal periodic policy can be defined as:
RT = max
x∈X
E
[
T∑
t=1
l(xt, at)− λ(x)xt
]
(3)
=
T∑
t=1
l(xt)− λ
∗
T∑
t=1
xt (4)
Our objective is to find a defense policy with low regret.
Note that any learning algorithm with limT→∞ RTT = 0
minimizes the long-term loss as T → ∞. We also note that
even if l(xt, at) as a function of xt (for a fixed at) has a sim-
ple structure, the mean loss function l(xt) , Eat(l(xt, at))
may have a complicated form depending on the distribu-
tion of at. Therefore, previous works on linear and convex
bandits cannot be directly applied to our problem. On the
other hand, we observe that the defender may obtain side-
observations during the game, which can be utilized to de-
sign more efficient learning algorithms.
Side observations: As we discussed before, the defender
learns the value of at if at < xt (hence its loss as well) at the
end of each round. From this feedback, the defender may get
side observations in the following sense. Consider any round
t. If at < xt, then the defender learns the value of at; there-
fore, it learns l(xi, at) for any xi ∈ X if it has played xi in-
stead of xt. On the other hand, if at ≥ xt, the defender only
learns the value of l(xi, at) = cd for any xi ≤ xt, but not
the value of l(xj , at) for xj > xt. This implies that playing
an arm that corresponds to a longer defense period provides
more side observations about other arms. Our learning algo-
rithm incorporates these side-observations to minimize the
expected regret. Indeed, our algorithm and its regret bound
apply to any loss function l(xt, at) where playing one period
provides side-observations to all shorter periods.
Multiple resources: Our model can be readily extended to
consider multiple resources (nodes) subject to i.i.d. attacks,
which can be used to model multiple users subject to inde-
pendent attacks in an online system such as Facebook. In this
case, samples from multiple nodes can be pooled together
when choosing the next defense period for a node. Con-
sider a system with N nodes that are subject to i.i.d. attacks
with unknown attack times sampled from Fa. Let τst denote
the time instance of the t-th security update on node s and
xst = τs(t+1) − τst the t-th defense period for node s. Note
that xst can be different for different s. Let ast denote the
attack time in the t-th attack towards node s. Let l(xst, ast)
denote the loss to the defender in round t over node s. When
the nodes are subject to i.i.d. attacks, there is an optimal
defense period x∗ for all nodes with minimum time aver-
age loss λ∗, similar to the single node setting. The i.i.d. as-
sumption may hold in practice because (1) some parameters
such as the attack time may be out of the control of the at-
tacker and can be approximated as i.i.d. random variables
during the time horizon of the game; (2) an adversarial at-
tacker may choose to avoid correlated attacks to make its be-
havior more unpredictable. Assume that the game is played
for Ts rounds over node s, and let T =
∑
s Ts. Then the
regret over the T rounds of play across all the nodes can be
defined as RT =
∑N
s=1
∑Ts
t=1 l(xst)− λ
∗
∑N
s=1
∑Ts
t=1 xst.
Note that, when choosing xst, feedback from all the nodes
received before τst can be used. Our online learning algo-
rithms can be directly applied to this setting.
Optimal Timing Algorithms
In this section, we present our learning algorithms for the
optimal timing problem for both discrete and continuous de-
fense periods.
Discrete Defense Periods
We first consider the finite-armed setting where the set of
defense periods is finite, denoted by X = {x1, ..., xK}.
Let it denote the index of the arm played in round t, i.e.,
xi(t) is the defense period chosen for round t. Let ni(t) =∑t
s=1 I(is = i) denote the number of plays of arm i during
the first t rounds. Let li,t = 1ni(t)
∑t
s=1 I(is = i)l(xi(s), as)
denote the average loss from arm i during the first t rounds,
and λi,t = li,txi the time average loss of arm i. To simplify
the notation, we omit the subscript t in li,t and λi,t when it
is clear from the context, and let li , l(xi) and λi , λ(xi).
Let ∆i = li − xiλ∗ denote the relative loss of playing arm
i. Note that ∆i∗ = 0 for an optimal arm i∗ and ∆i ∈ [0, 1]
by our assumption about l. Then RT =
∑
i6=i∗ ∆iE(ni(T )).
Let ∆min , mini:∆i>0∆i and ∆max , maxi∆i.
To derive an optimal defense policy, we consider
the following variant of the improved upper confidence
Algorithm 1 Improved UCB algorithm for time-associative
bandits with side observations
Input: A set of periods X , the number of rounds T .
Initialization: Set ∆˜0 = 1, X0 = X .
for m = 0, 1, 2, ..., do
x(1) = min{xi ∈ Xm}; x(2) = max{xi ∈ Xm}.
Arm selection:
If |Xm| = 1, play the single period in Xm until T .
Else play the longest period in Xm until round
min(nm, T ), where nm =
⌈
2γm log(T (K+1)∆˜
2
m)
∆˜2m
⌉
and
γm =
(
1 +
x(2)
x(1)
)2
; update li, λi for all xi ∈ Xm.
Arm elimination:
λm = minxi∈Xm
(
λi + cm/xi
)
where cm =√
log(T (K+1)∆˜2m)
2nm
.
To getXm+1, delate all the periods xi ∈ Xm such that
li−xiλm ≥ minxj∈Xm lj−xjλm+2
(
1 +
xj
x(1)
)
cm.
Reset: ∆˜m+1 = ∆˜m2 .
bound based policy proposed in (Auer and Ortner 2010) for
stochastic bandits. We modify the improved UCB policy to
address the time associative regret while taking the depen-
dence between arms into account.
The algorithm proceeds in multiple stages, where each
stage involves multiple rounds (see Algorithm 1). In each
stage m, as in the improved UCB policy, our policy esti-
mates ∆i by a value ∆˜m, and maintains a set of active arms
Xm. ∆˜0 is initialized to 1 and is halved in each stage. X0
initially contains all the arms. At the end of each stage m, a
subset of arms are deleted from Xm according to their ob-
served losses in previous rounds. Compared with the im-
proved UCB policy for stochastic bandits, our policy has
several key differences. First, in the arm selection phase,
each active arm is played nm − nm−1 times in stage m in
the improved UCB policy, where nm is a function of ∆˜m
and is chosen so that any suboptimal arm i is eliminated as
soon as ∆˜m <
∆i
2 with high probability. In contrast, only
the longest period in Xm is played nm− nm−1 times in our
policy, which provides side observations to all the shorter
periods as we discussed above. For any arm xi ∈ Xm, li
is defined as if i is played in all the previous nm rounds.
In addition, the definition of nm in our policy is different
from the improved UCB policy. In particular, nm depends
on the ratio of the maximum active period to the minimum
active period, which is needed to bound the time associative
regret. Second, in the arm elimination phase, we compare
the relative losses of arms instead of average losses as in the
improved UCB, since average loss alone does not take the
length of a defense period into account. In particular, we es-
timate the relative loss of arm i by li,nm − xiλm, where λm
is an estimate of λ∗ defined by
λm = min
xi∈Xm
(
λi,nm + cm/xi
) (5)
where cm =
√
log(T (K+1)∆˜2m)
2nm
. The value of cm is chosen
so that for all i, λi,nm is in the cm/xi-vicinity of λi with
high probability.
To establish the regret bound of the algorithm, we need
the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound (Hoeffding 1963))
Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be a sequence of independent random
variables with support [a, b] and E(Xt) = µ for all Xt. Let
Xn =
1
n
∑n
t=1Xt. Then for any ǫ > 0, we have
P{Xn ≥ µ+ ǫ} ≤ e
− 2nǫ
2
(b−a)2 ,
P{Xn ≤ µ− ǫ} ≤ e
− 2nǫ
2
(b−a)2 .
Lemma 2. Consider any stage m where there is an optimal
arm i∗ ∈ Xm. If li ≤ li + cm for all xi ∈ Xm and l∗ ≥
li∗ − cm, then we must have λ∗ ≤ λm ≤ λ∗ + 2cm/xi∗ .
Proof. To see this, let xj ∈ Xm be the arm that minimizes
λj . Then we have λ∗ ≤ λj ≤ λj + cm/xj = λm, and
λm ≤ λi∗ + cm/xi∗ ≤ λ∗ + 2cm/xi∗ .
We now show the following bound on the expected regret
of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. The expected regret of Algorithm 1 is at most
48γ log
(
T (K+1)
∆2max
4
)
∆min
+
∑
i:∆i>0
(
∆i +
48
∆i
)
, where γ =
(1 + xmaxxmin )
2
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the opti-
mal arm is unique and has index K , and sort the set of arms
such that ∆1 ≥ ∆2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∆K = 0. For any subopti-
mal arm i, let mi = min{m : ∆˜m < 12∆i} denote the first
stage in which ∆˜m < 12∆i. We have 2
mi = 1
∆˜mi
≤ 4∆i <
1
∆˜mi+1
= 2mi+1. Note that m1 ≤ m2 ≤ · · · ≤ mK−1.
We consider the following events similar
to (Perchet and Rigollet 2013). Let Ai denote the event
that the optimal arm has not been eliminated before stage
mi, and Bi the event that every arm j ∈ {1, 2, ..., i}
has been eliminated in stage mj or before. We have
A1 ⊇ A2 · · · ⊇ AK−1 and B1 ⊇ B2 · · · ⊇ BK−1. Let
Ci = Ai ∩ Bi for i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K − 1}. Under the event
Ci, let Ui denote the contribution to the regret from arms
{1, 2, ..., i} and Vi the contribution to the regret from arms
{i + 1, ...,K − 1}. We observe that Vi ≤ T∆i+1. Let C0
denote the sample space. We then have
RT =
K−1∑
i=1
P(Ci−1\Ci)(Ui + Vi)
≤
K−1∑
i=1
UiP(Ci−1\Ci) +
K−1∑
i=1
T∆iP(Ci−1\Ci)
≤
K−1∑
i=1
UiP(Ci−1\Ci) +
K−1∑
i=1
T∆iP(B
c
i ∩Bi−1 ∩Ai)
+
K−1∑
i=1
T∆iP(A
c
i ∩Ci−1) (6)
We bound each of the three terms in (6) as follows:
First term in (6): Under the event Ci, each suboptimal arm
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., i} is eliminated on or before round nmj =⌈
2γmj log(T (K+1)∆˜
2
mj
)
∆˜2mj
⌉
. Among these arms, let j1, j2, ..., jk
denote the sequence of suboptimal arms played where xj1 >
... > xjk , and arm ji is eliminated in stage m′ji ≤ mji . Let
B , 2γ log
(
T (K + 1)
∆2max
4
)
. We then have
Ui ≤ ∆j1nm′j1 +
k∑
i=2
∆ji(nm′ji
− nm′
ji−1
)
≤∆j1nm′j1 +
k∑
i=2
∆ji
(
1 +
2γ log(T (K + 1)∆˜2mji )
∆˜2mji
−
2γ log(T (K + 1)∆˜2mji−1 )
∆˜2mji−1
)
≤∆j1nm′j1 +
k∑
i=2
∆ji + 4B
k∑
i=2
∆˜mji
(
1
∆˜2mji
− 1
∆˜2mji−1
)
≤∆j1nm′j1 +
k∑
i=2
∆ji + 4B
k∑
i=2
1.5∆˜mji−1 (∆˜mji−1 − ∆˜mji )
∆˜mji ∆˜
2
mji−1
=∆j1nm′j1
+
k∑
i=2
∆ji + 6B
k∑
i=2
(
1
∆˜mji
− 1
∆˜mji−1
)
≤
k∑
i=1
∆ji + 6B
1
∆˜mjk
≤
k∑
i=1
∆ji + 24B
1
∆jk
Therefore,
∑K−1
i=1 UiP(Ci−1\Ci) ≤
∑K−1
i=1 ∆i + 24B
1
∆min
.
Second term in (6): Under the event Bci ∩Bi−1 ∩Ai, the optimal
arm is not eliminated by mi, neither does arm i. We first note that
if li ≥ li − cmi and lK ≤ lK + cmi hold, then arm i will be
eliminated in round mi. Indeed, from the definitions of cm and
nm, we have cmi ≤
∆˜mi
2
√
γmi
=
∆˜mi+1√
γmi
< ∆i
4
√
γmi
. Then from
Lemma 2, we have
li − xiλmi ≥li − xi(λ∗ + 2cmi/xK)
≥li − xi(λ∗ + 2cmi/xK)− cmi
=lK − xKλ∗ +∆i − 2 xi
xK
cmi − cmi
>lK − xKλ∗ + 4√γmicmi − 2
xi
xK
cmi − cmi
≥lK − xKλ∗ + 2
(
1 +
xK
x(1)
)
cmi
≥lK − xKλmi + 2
(
1 +
xK
x(1)
)
cmi
where x(1) is the minimum active period in stage mi. It follows
that arm i is eliminated in stage mi as claimed.
It follows that P(Bci ∩ Bi−1 ∩ Ai) ≤ P(li < li − cmi ) +
P(li∗ > li∗ + cmi) ≤ 1T (K+1)∆˜2mi +
1
T (K+1)∆˜2mi
≤ 1
T ∆˜2mi
by
the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. Therefore, the second term in (6)
can be bounded by
∑
i
T∆i
1
T ∆˜2mi
≤∑
i
16
∆i
.
Third term in (6): Under the event Aci ∩ Ci−1, every arm j ∈
{1, 2, ...i−1} has been eliminated by stagemj and the optimal arm
is eliminated by some arm k ≥ i in some stage m∗ where mi−1 <
m∗ ≤ mi. We first claim that if lk ≥ lk−cm∗ and lK ≤ lK+cm∗
hold, then the optimal arm is not eliminated by arm k in stage m∗.
To see this, assume that the optimal arm is eliminated, which hap-
pens only when lK−xKλm∗ ≥ lk−xkλm∗+2
(
1 + xk
x(1)
)
cm∗ .
From Lemma 2, we have:
lk − xkλ∗ ≤lk + cm∗ − xk(λm∗ − 2cm∗/xK)
≤lk − xkλm∗ + cm∗ + 2
xk
xK
cm∗
≤lk − xkλm∗ + 2
(
1 +
xk
x(1)
)
cm∗ − cm∗
≤lK − xKλm∗ − cm∗
≤lK − xKλ∗
which contradicts the fact that k is suboptimal. It follows that the
probability that the optimal arm is eliminated by a fixed arm k ≥ i
in a fixed stage m∗ ≤ mi is bounded by P(lk < lk − cm∗) +
P(lK > lK + cm∗ ) ≤ 1T ∆˜2m∗ by the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound.
Therefore, the third term in (6) is bounded by
K−1∑
i=1
mi∑
m∗=mi−1+1
K−1∑
k=i
1
T ∆˜2m∗
T∆i
=
maximi∑
m∗=0
∑
k:mk≥m∗
1
T ∆˜2m∗
T max
h:mh≥m∗
∆h
≤
maximi∑
m∗=0
∑
k:mk≥m∗
1
∆˜2m∗
4∆˜m∗
=
K−1∑
i=1
mi∑
m∗=0
4
∆˜m∗
≤
K−1∑
i=1
4 · 2mi+1 ≤
K−1∑
i=1
32
∆i
Putting all the three cases together, we get the desired regret
bound.
Remark 1. Our algorithm achieves a regret where the
coefficient of the log(T ) term is independent of K , the
number of arms. This is obtained by utilizing the side
observations among arms. In contrast, a direct applica-
tion of the UCB based policy for time-associative bandits
in (Gyo¨rgy et al. 2007) to our problem leads to a regret of
O
(∑K
i=1
γ log(T (K+1))
∆2
i
)
, where the log(T ) term has a co-
efficient that is linear of K .
Remark 2. In our numerical study, we also consider a vari-
ant of Algorithm 1 where in arm elimination phase, we de-
late all the periods xi ∈ Xm such that li − xiλm ≥
minxj∈Xm lj −xjλm+4cm. By using a smaller confidence
interval, this variant eliminates suboptimal arms more ag-
gressively than Algorithm 1. Although we are not able to
prove a regret bound for this variant, it exhibits even better
performance than Algorithm 1 in our numerical study.
Continuous Defense Periods
We next consider the case where the defense periods can
take any real value in X = [xmin, xmax]. Note that in this
case, the bound given in Theorem 1 can be very poor due
to the large K and small ∆i. Built upon Algorithm 1, we
propose a new policy with a regret that is independent of
K and ∆i under the following assumption. Let l(x) =
Ea1(l(x, a1)) denote the expected loss when a period x is
played. We assume that l(x) is Lipschitz continuous: there
exists a constant L ≥ 0 such that for any x1, x2 ∈ X ,
|l(x1) − l(x2)| ≤ L|x1 − x2|. For instance, when the at-
tack time follows a uniform distribution in [a1, a2], and f(·)
is binary, we have |l(x1)− l(x2)| ≤ 1a2−a1 |x1−x2|, and we
can take L = 1a2−a1 .
Our algorithm is inspired by UCB for continuous ban-
dits (UCBC) (Auer, Ortner, and Szepesva´ri 2007). We first
divide X into n subintervals of equal length, where n is a
parameter to be determined (see Algorithm 2). Let xk ,
xmin + k
xmax−xmin
n denote the longest period in the k-
th interval. We then apply Algorithm 1 to the set of arms
I , {x1, ..., xn}.
Algorithm 2 Improved UCB based optimal timing with con-
tinuous periods
Input: A set of periods X = [xmin, xmax], the number of
rounds T , the number of subintervals n.
Initialization: For k = 1, 2, ..., n, xk = xmin +
k xmax−xminn .
Apply Algorithm 1 to I = {x1, x2..., xn}.
Define I1 , [xmin, x1] and Ik , (xk−1, xk] for 1 < k ≤
n. For any x ∈ X , let ∆(x) , l(x)−xλ∗ denote the relative
loss of x. Among xk ∈ I , assume xk∗ has the minimum
λ(xk). Let ∆′(x) , l(x)− xλ(xk∗ ) denote the relative loss
of arm x with respect to xk∗ . It is clear that ∆′(x) ≤ ∆(x).
We further have the following property about ∆ and ∆′.
Lemma 3. ∆(xk∗ ) ≤ L′n−1 and ∆(x) −∆′(x) ≤ L′n−1,
where L′ = Lxmax(xmax−xmin)xmin .
From the lemma, we can establish the following perfor-
mance bound for Algorithm 2.
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Figure 2: Numerical Results.
Theorem 2. The expected regret of the variant of the im-
proved UCB policy for continuous bandits described in Al-
gorithm 2 is at most 3L′n−1T + 48γ log(T (n+1))L′n−1 +
48n2
L′ +
n∆max. By taking n = T 1/3, we have RT ≤ O(T 2/3).
Proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorem 2 are provided in the
Appendix.
Numerical Results
In this section, we demonstrate the advantages of our
learning algorithms through numerical study. We use the
following synthetic dataset. We assume that the attack
time at follows an i.i.d. Weibull Distribution with CDF
F (a) = 1 − e−(a/λ)
b for a ≥ 0 and F (a) = 0
for a < 0. This model has been used in reliabil-
ity engineering (Mazzuchi and Soyer 1996) and cybersecu-
rity (Tan and Xia 2016) to model failure times. Note that
when b = 1, the Weibull Distribution becomes the expo-
nential distribution. By setting b > 1, the model indicates
that the failure rate increases with time. We set b = 2 in ex-
periments. In each trial, λ is chosen from the interval [1, 20]
uniformly at random. We consider a 19 arm setting with xi
evenly distributed in [1, 10] with a step size of 0.5. We con-
sider both the binary loss function and the linear loss func-
tion mentioned in the model section. In both cases, we fix
the defense cost to cd = 0.1. With these parameter settings,
we observe that the best arm varies over the feasible defense
periods when we vary λ.
We focus on the case where side observations are avail-
able (without attack cost) and compare our algorithms
with the UCB based time-associative bandit algorithm
in (Gyo¨rgy et al. 2007) (TUCB) that do not consider side ob-
servations. We further consider a variant of TUCB that uses
the TUCB policy to choose the arm to play in each round and
obtains side-observations after each play (TUCB-side). This
algorithm can be considered as the application of the UCB-N
policy and the UCB-MaxN policy in (Caron et al. 2012) to
the time associative bandit model (UCB-N and UCB-MaxN
give the same policy under the dependence structure we
consider.) For our algorithms, we evaluate both Algorithm
1 (TUCB-improved-side) and its variant discussed above
(TUCB-improved-side-2). The results are averaged over 100
independent trials and are given in Figure 2. We note that
the linear loss setting represents the harder case since it in-
troduces smaller variances across arms. We observe that for
both loss functions, our algorithms can significantly reduce
long-term regrets compared to TUCB and TUCB-side by
carefully incorporating side observations. Moreover, TUCB-
improved-side-2 achieves the best performance among the
four algorithms.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
Assume λ∗ = λ(x∗) for x∗ ∈ Ij . By the definition of k∗,
we have λ(xk∗ ) = l(xk∗ )xk∗ ≤
l(xj)
xj
= λ(xj). It follows that
∆(xk∗ ) = l(xk∗)− xk∗λ
∗
≤ l(xj)
xk∗
xj
− xk∗λ
∗
=
xk∗
xj
(l(xj)− xjλ
∗)
≤
xmax
xmin
∆(xj).
Moreover,
∆(xj) = l(xj)− xjλ
∗
= l(xj)− xj
l(x∗)
x∗
≤ l(xj)− l(x
∗)
≤ L|xj − x
∗|
≤ L
xmax − xmin
n
Therefore, ∆(xk∗ ) ≤ Lxmaxxmin
xmax−xmin
n . Similarly, ∆(x) −
∆′(x) = x(λ(xk∗ ) − λ(x∗)) ≤ x(λ(xj) − λ(x∗)) =
x(
l(xj)
xj
− l(x
∗)
x∗ ) ≤
x
x∗ (l(xj)− l(x
∗)) ≤ xmaxxmin L
xmax−xmin
n .
Proof of Theorem 2
We split the set of intervals into two parts. Define S ,
{k ∈ I : ∆(xk) > 2L′n−1}. We have RT =∑n
k=1∆(xk)E(nk(T )) where nk(T ) denotes the number
of times that xk is played. Let RT = RT,1 + RT,2,
where RT,1 =
∑
k 6∈S ∆(xk)E(nk(T )) and RT,2 =∑
k∈S ∆(xk)E(nk(T )). It is easy to see that R1 ≤
2L′n−1T . On the other hand, we have
RT,2 =
∑
k∈S
∆(xk)E(nk(T ))
≤
∑
k∈S
(∆′(xk) + L
′n−1)E(nk(T ))
≤
∑
k∈S
∆′(xk)E(nk(T )) + L
′n−1T
By Theorem 1, we have
∑
k∈S ∆
′(xk)E(nk(T )) ≤
48γ log(T (n+1))
mink∈S ∆′(xk)
+
∑
k∈S
(
∆′(xk) +
48
∆′(xk)
)
. By Lemma 3,
∆′(xk) ≥ ∆(xk) − L′n−1 ≥ L′n−1 for any k ∈ S. It
follows that, RT ≤ 3L′n−1T + 48γ log(T (n+1))L′n−1 +
48n2
L′ +
n∆max. By taking n = T 1/3, we have RT ≤ O(T 2/3).
Costly Attacks
Our model and solutions can be extended to a myopic at-
tacker with a hidden attack cost ca. After observing the de-
fender’s move in the beginning of round t, the attacker at-
tacks immediately if Eat [(xt − at)+] > ca, and does not
attack in that round otherwise That is, it attacks only if its
expected benefit is larger than the attack cost. Equivalently,
we can assume there is a period x0 such that the attacker
attacks only when xt > x0. We can further distinguish the
following two cases.
• Fixed Attack Cost: In this case, there is a fixed x0 that
is unknown to the defender such that there is no attack in
round t if xt ≤ x0 is played (thus the defender only suf-
fers from the defense cost). The defender’s loss in round
t is defined as:
l(xt, at) =
{
cd if xt ≤ x0,
f [(xt − at)+] + cd if xt > x0.
(7)
Note that by setting x0 ≤ xmin, this case reduces to the
setting when there is no attack cost.
• Random Attack Cost: In this case, x0 is i.i.d. sampled in
each round from an unknown distribution. The defender’s
loss in round t is same as (7).
When there is a fixed attack cost, playing a longer period
xi provides side-observation to a shorter arm xj only when
xj > x0. Since x0 is unknown, it is insufficient to only play
the longest period in each round as we did before. Therefore,
we modify Algorithm 1 by maintaining a set of periods Ym
that the defender knows to be longer than x0 by stage m.
We set Y0 = ∅. Since x0 is fixed, whenever an attack is
observed when playing a period xi, we know xj > x0 for
all xj ≥ xi. In each stage m, for each active period in Ym,
the algorithm plays the longest one only as before to exploit
side-observations. However, each active period not in Ym
requires further exploration. Therefore, they are also played
the same number of times in each stage. But whenever an
attack is observed on xi, all xj ≥ xi are added to Ym and
they don’t need to be played separately any further. We can
prove the following regret bound for the modified algorithm.
Theorem 3. The expected regret of the above algo-
rithm is at most
∑
i:xi≤x0
Bi
∆i
+
∑
i:xi>x0
min
(
Bi
∆i
, ∆ipi
)
+
48γ log
(
T (K+1)
∆2max
4
)
∆min
+
∑
i:∆i>0
(
∆i +
48
∆i
)
, where Bi =
32γ log
(
T (K + 1)
∆2i
4
)
, and pi , P(l(xi, at) > 0).
Proof. We adopt a similar argument as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1. In particular, the last two terms in (6) can be bounded
using the same argument. The only difference is in the
first term. For every period xi < x0, we bound its regret
up to stage mi by ∆inmi ≤ ∆i
⌈
2γ log(T (K+1)∆˜2mi )
∆˜2mi
⌉
<
∆i
(
1 +
32γ log(T (K+1)
∆2
i
4 )
∆2
i
)
, which gives the first term
(and part of the last term) in the regret. Next consider a pe-
riod xj > x0. Let pj , P(l(xj , at) > 0) denote the proba-
bility that an attack is observed when playing xj . From the
algorithm, the expected number of rounds until xj is added
to Ym is bounded by min( 1pj , nmj ), which gives the sec-
ond term in the regret (and part of the last term). After xj is
added to Ym, it is played only when it becomes the longest
active period in Y , which gives the third term in the regret
using the same argument for the first term of (6) in Theo-
rem 1.
When x0 is i.i.d. sampled from an unknown distribution,
playing longer periods do not provide deterministic side-
observations to any shorter arms. This can be addressed
by playing every active arm in Xm until round nm =⌈
2γ log(T (K+1)∆˜2m)
∆˜2m
⌉
in each stage m. The algorithm applies
to any time associative stochastic bandit problem with ar-
bitrary lt(xt, at). By applying a similar argument as in the
proof of Theorem 1, the algorithm achieves a regret bound
of
∑K
i=1
32γ log
(
T (K+1)
∆2
i
4
)
∆i
+
∑
i:∆i>0
(
∆i +
48
∆i
)
.
